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Mexico City’s periphery is home to marginalized com-
munities, and mainly constituted of autoconstructed 
houses built along the dried lakebed of Lake Texcoco. 
These settlements are subjected to amplified earth-
quake risk because of below-ground soil conditions 
in the lakebed beneath them, which makes them an 
ideal place to study the social production of risk. In 
Colonia del Mar, Tláhuac, people believe their com-
munity is built atop rubble dumped there after the 
1985 earthquake. It is said the government illegally 
dumped debris from collapsed structures into the 
lakebed swamp that would be urbanized as Colonia 
del Mar. In 2017, another major earthquake caused 
structural collapses and damage along the lakebed 
edge, and especially in Colonia del Mar. This paper ex-
plores the factual possibility for these below-ground 
conditions and argues that approaches for relocation 
and rebuilding in Mexico City’s periphery are pro-
foundly informed by historical processes that socially 
produce risk in marginalized areas. 
Life Above, Rubble Below: 
A Case of Historically Produced 
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Introduction
Mexico City is a high-inequity place with disaster risk 
divided spatially and along geologic and class lines. 
Most of the Mexico City metropolitan zone is exposed 
to multiple environmental hazards, including relative-
ly frequent and widespread earthquakes and flooding. 
Risk is high in many areas of Mexico City, but partic-
ularly so in the areas where Lago de Texcoco (Lake 
Texcoco) used to be. Some of these places correspond 
to the center of the city while others are part of the 
urban periphery, which is home to more marginalized 
communities. The peripheral settlements at the south-
east edge of the city are mainly constituted of auto-
construido (autoconstructed or “self-built”) houses at 
the edge of the mostly dried lake bed that constituted 
the Texcoco lake system, which has been continuously 
drained in favor of urbanization since the Spaniards 
colonized the region in the 16th century. Autocon-
strucción (autoconstruction) is common in these 
peripheral areas, and there are socioeconomic vulner-
abilities and lakebed soil conditions that amplify risk 
and complicate recovery from earthquake disasters 
and flooding. In addition to flooding hazards, the soft, 
spongy lakebed soil conditions, present at both the 
center and in the periphery of the city, amplify ground 
motion during earthquakes, and increase disaster risk 
for the people living in this built environment (Niko-
laou et al., 2019). However, risk is not equally distrib-
uted. In an earthquake disaster the peripheral areas 
are potentially worst hit, take much longer to recover, 
and are often neglected by the authorities responsible 
for reconstruction and civil service.
Located on the border of Tláhuac adjacent to the 
watery alcaldía of Xochimilco, Colonia del Mar is a 
neighborhood that was particularly affected by the 
M7.1 earthquake in 2017, where citizens have adapt-
ed to collapsing structures and the massive grietas 
where ground failure has ruptured neighborhood 
thoroughfares with informal solutions that have 
persisted well into 2019. In this marginalized place, 
there is a popular narrative: In 1985, before Tláhuac 
and the surrounding area was built out and urban-
ized, a massive M8.1 earthquake devastated Mexico 
City. Over ten thousand buildings were destroyed 
along with miles of infrastructure throughout the city. 
Local people say that part of the structural rubble 
Risk is not equally 
distributed.
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and debris from these collapsed structures was used 
to fill the swampy area like a landfill in what would 
become Colonia del Mar. The colonia’s name literally 
means “from the sea”, and makes reference to the 
sandbanks surrounded by shallow waters which were 
filled in and then urbanized in the late 1980s. Since 
the colonia was built atop this debris-filled landfill, 
earthquake risk is extremely high due to the unstable 
below-ground conditions. Since the time the del Mar 
was founded, residents have suffered from subsid-
ence and surface cracks in the land. While there is no 
official documentation for this story, it is generally 
believed to be true and is potentially supported by 
spatial data showing concentrated damage in the area 
from the 2017 earthquake. If this narrative is factual, 
it would have implications for how we understand the 
risk assumed by this community in Tláhuac. If we are 
thinking about the historically produced disaster risk 
in Mexico City in general, how do conditions like these 
inform the perception of risk? If the risk assumed by 
residents of Tláhuac is produced and made worse 
by government-led illegal processes that increase 
potential harm to people living in the city’s periphery, 
what should be the approach to reconstruct or relo-
cate – and which is the better option for communities 
largely forgotten by city leadership?
History and the Social Production of Risk
Historical processes heavily influence the production 
of risk. In the case of Mexico City, the Mexica, a pow-
erful Aztec faction, made the crucial decision in 1325 
to found Mexico-Tenochtitlán on an islet in the middle 
of Lake Texcoco. From her to the Spanish conquest 
to the Porfiriato, this decision would determine the 
history and evolution of Mexico City more than any 
other factor. The earthquake disasters of 1985 and 
2017 have since confirmed the traumatic certainty of 
this prediction.
Early settlers in what is now Mexico City have been 
manipulating the lacustrine environment that makes 
up the great basin since long before the Spanish con-
quest. Mexico-Tenochtitlán was protected by earthen 
dams, and the Mexica grew crops on the water using 
floating chinampas flanked my man-made canals 
and raised walkways for travel around the city (Vitz, 
2018). The Mexica did not necessarily live in total har-
If the risk assumed 
by residents is 
produced and 
made worse by 
government-led 
illegal processes, 
what should be 
the approach to 
reconstruct or 
relocate?
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mony with their environment, but unlike the Spanish, 
the indigines were fully aware of the “levee effect” 
that came with these infrastructures, and managed 
that risk through incorporated farming techniques 
and designated land uses (Candiani, 2014: 34). The 
difference then was a matter of both scale and modes 
of production. It wasn’t until the Spanish brought new 
urban settlement patterns, new land-based agrarian 
modes, and new profit-driven industry to urbanize 
Mexico-Tenochtitlán that floods became real disasters 
(Candiani, 2014; Crouch et al., 1982).
After the fall of Mexico-Tenochtitlán in 1521, Hernán 
Cortés built the capital of New Spain on top of the old 
city for political and symbolic reasons, despite any 
perceived challenges posed by the city’s location on 
the lake (García Acosta et al., 2003). However, the chi-
nampas and most of the transport canals had no place 
in the new colonial city, and the Spaniards embarked 
on deliberate efforts to remove the water as they built 
out the new city. This effort began with the progres-
sive desiccation of Lake Texcoco. This process is well 
documented by historians, and these various drain-
age efforts would have implications for disaster risk 
in the modern city. As the Spaniards were gradually 
polishing and beautifying their new city, they were 
constantly fighting the lake, which did not mesh with 
the urban ideal that guided them, and resulted in sig-
nificant flood disasters throughout the colonial period 
(Candiani, 2014; Crouch et al., 1982; García, 2004). 
When early efforts to resist these floods proved futile, 
the apparent solution was to drain the basin. In 1608, 
the massive Desagüe de Huehuetoca (drainage system) 
public works project was completed, but the lake sys-
tem was far too complex and the problem of flooding 
was only partially solved (Candiani, 2014). In 1629, 
flood disaster drowned the city for five years, mak-
ing evident the need to take more extreme measures 
(Crouch et al., 1982). The option to relocate the capital 
was considered. However, the symbolic value of the 
place and potential economic losses were evaluated 
and it was decided that the city would remain in the 
basin (García, 2004). At this time, the dangerous sub-
soil conditions started to become evident. Due to the 
soft lacustrine soils, the city was beginning to sink in 
a process called subsidence, causing the stone-walled 
colonial buildings to recede into the ground, further 
Most of the history 
of the urbanization 
process of the 
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exacerbating flood and drainage problems (Candiani, 
2014; Martínez, 1980). The issue of subsidence would 
persist through the modern period and has indeed 
remained an issue that affects both flood and earth-
quake risk today (Vitz, 2018).
Mexico City entered modernity under the regime of 
Porfirio Díaz (1876-1911). Díaz’s goal to modernize 
the country, coupled with his admiration for French 
architecture and urbanism, has had profound conse-
quences for Mexico City in general and for the city’s 
disaster risk in particular. By 1910, the population 
of the city grew from 200,000 inhabitants to 470,000 
under the Porfiriato. During that time, the city’s ur-
banized area grew from 8.5 to 40 square km (Morales, 
1978). This rapid urban expansion was made possible 
by increased desiccation of swampy areas, which ex-
panded the buildable area in and around Mexico City 
and resulted in the emergence of an extensive real 
estate market on high risk areas (Gruzinski, 2004: 484) 
and produced further peripheral settlements. In addi-
tion to new neighborhoods, there were also significant 
advances in urban infrastructure that sought to make 
the city more functional. Particularly noteworthy was 
the construction of the Gran Canal del Desagüe (the 
Great Drainage Canal), which was completed in 1900. 
The objective of this canal was to drain all remaining 
water from Lake Texcoco, which still covered a large 
part of the capital’s territory and was not yet devel-
oped. The canal was imagined as a permanent solu-
tion to both flood and sanitation issues by expelling 
Mexico City’s lake water and wastewater out of the 
basin (Agostoni, 2003). Despite these major infrastruc-
tural endeavors, it was still possible to navigate the 
canals from Chalco and Xochimilco at the Southern 
edge of the city and reach the city center at the end 
of the nineteenth century. The fight against nature 
persisted, and the flood risk remained, growing worse 
in the lakebed areas as the city expanded.
These groundwater extraction projects were known 
to contribute to subsidence as early as the mid 1920s 
(Carrillo, 1969 cited in Tellman et al., 2018). The 
problem was ignored by officials, and groundwater 
pumping increased in frequency and intensity until 
the 1940s (Marsal and Mazari 1962; Marsal 1992 cited 
in Tellman et al., 2018). Subsidence rates reached an 
incredible 18 centimeters per year from 1930-1960 
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(Tellman et al., 2018). By 2018 some areas of the cap-
ital, including Tláhuac, were sinking up to 40 cm per 
year. Most of the history of the urbanization process 
of the city has been characterized by being accelerat-
ed, profit driven, disorderly, and with serious negative 
environmental effects. Currently, more than half of 
the city’s inhabitants live in areas that began as irreg-
ular settlements in the periphery, outside the formal 
housing market and with little or no planning (Padilla 
and Rebeco, 2009) and in many cases on unstable 
lakebed subsoil. The relationship between water man-
agement, rapid urbanization, peripheral neglect and 
devastating earthquake effects was evident in both 
the 1985 and 2017 disasters. This history is relevant 
since it sheds light on the ways in which risk has been 
produced in Mexico City. Every decision made since 
the founding of Mexico-Tenochtitlan and the Spanish 
conquest has shaped the city’s risk in a particular way. 
Issues of subsidence, development on soft soils, the 
provision of infrastructure, and socioeconomic dispar-
ities in settlement patterns poses serious vulnerabil-
ity to earthquakes and flooding that have been, to a 
profound extent, produced. 
Natural disasters are not natural at all, but are rather 
the result of environmental hazards interacting with 
the built environment and vulnerable populations 
(Comfort et al., 1999). Scholars who study risk agree 
that risk to society from environmental hazards is 
generated, or at least influenced, by human deci-
sion-making and behavior (Beck, 1992; Tierney, 2014). 
Human settlement patterns show an attraction to 
“environmental amenities” that lead to settlements in 
areas exposed to hazards (Tierney, 2014). People have 
settled along coastlines, in river basins, in fire-prone 
forests, and so on. The Mexica and later, the Span-
iards, were no different when they chose to settle in 
the lacustrine basin of Lake Texcoco. Tierney unpacks 
this concept of place further, citing that disasters that 
result from this exposure are brought about through 
societal factors that create conditions for them. 
From The Social Roots of Risk: “disasters themselves 
are largely the consequence of - socioeconomic and 
political conditions that exist in affected societies 
and communities; global processes that contribute to 
so-called underdevelopment; legacies of colonialism, 
which include exploitation of natural resources and 
Natural disasters 
are not natural 
at all, but are 
rather the result 
of environmental 
hazards interacting 
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the environment; and processes that marginalize 
societies and groups within societies.” (Susman et al., 
1983, as cited in Tierney, 2014: 39) Thus, the effects of 
disasters are inherently the product of these patterns 
of human settlement that foster exposure to hazards, 
coupled with forms of social differentiation and pow-
er that create conditions for vulnerability (Tierney, 
2014; Blaikie et al., 1994). 
Studies on the social production of risk call into ques-
tion the existing socioeconomic conditions of societies 
and the interventions of political, elite, and informal 
actors, particularly through the implementation of 
infrastructure projects, political regime shifts, and 
top-down planning processes intended to modernize 
places and control hazards (Blaikie et al., 1994; Harvey, 
1996; Tierney, 2014). In these ways, risk is produced 
through infrastructure, often in response to previous 
disasters, or as a preventative measure where there 
are known hazards. Tierney points to social construc-
tionism or “socially constructed ideas” as concepts 
that promote risk, for example, through political- and 
elite-driven safety measures that prioritize profit-mak-
ing development (Tierney, 2014: 58). Using levees 
as an example, Tierney explains that infrastructure 
creates risk and conditions for disaster by promoting 
an illusion of protection and encouraging development 
in high hazard areas. Continued development, for 
example, along rivers creates environmental changes 
and destroys natural protective barriers that can also 
amplify risk (Tierney, 2014: 59). Put another way, actors 
with power and authority shape vulnerability and 
determine “robustness” to new and existing threats 
over time through their decisive actions. These urban 
decisionmakers’ responses to emergent threats can 
increase vulnerability in their communities and in fact 
make their cities less resilient as a direct result of risk 
mitigation projects (Tellman et al., 2018). 
Development patterns evident in Mexico City over 
time show that the social production of risk is intrin-
sically tied to the city’s history. The city’s legacy of 
major infrastructure projects designed to shape the 
natural environment and control it for optimized 
capitalist production schemes and political power 
that began with the conquest and grand scale colonial 
drainage projects (Candiani, 2014). Over several re-
gimes, Lake Texcoco has been drained and shaped to 
The city’s 
legacy of major 
infrastructure 
projects designed to 
shape the natural 
environment 
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support the proliferation and urbanization of Mexico 
City, and since then the region’s water sector has been 
expanded and privatized, consequently exacerbating 
both environmental hazards and and the exclusion 
of communities from access to water services (Castro, 
2004; Tellman et al., 2018). In effect, there have indeed 
been and continue to be socioeconomic and political 
factors that affect vulnerability differently in various 
parts of the city and at different scales. Large scale 
disasters, like earthquakes, affect entire regions, but 
conditions at the local scale show disparate levels of 
resilience and ability to recover. In Mexico City, be-
low-ground conditions and water provision are two im-
portant factors in recovery at the local level. Spatially 
and politically, water infrastructure creates a dispar-
ity of interests as it serves to both provide a resource 
and assist with adaptation to flooding, but simultane-
ously generates risk in vulnerable areas that receive 
fewer services and less attention when an earthquake 
disaster affects underground infrastructure. 
Fig. 1 – Cracked 
street  18 months 
after the earthquake 
(photo Luis Razzo).
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This is exemplified in Tláhuac and other alcaldías in 
Mexico City’s periphery, where a large scale earth-
quake disaster in 2017 rocked the city differently in 
the edge of the former lake than it did in other areas. 
Much of the outer regions are still recovering, and 
are doing so without consistent access to water since 
below-ground infrastructure was damaged and never 
repaired. If the story about the debris dumped in 
marshy ground below Colonia del Mar in Tláhuac is 
true, the decisions made during a past earthquake 
recovery period has increased the risk for an already 
socioeconomically vulnerable community. Similar-
ly, how the government of Mexico City decides to 
approach recovery in del Mar and colonias like it will 
determine communities’ risk for inevitable future 
disasters.
Situating Colonia del Mar, Tláhuac
Tláhuac is an alcaldía of Mexico City that is regularly 
socioeconomically, politically, and infrastructurally 
disconnected from sanitation and water resources. 
Located in the southeast of the city at the edge of the 
former Texcoco lakebed, Tláhuac is home to agricul-
tural towns and low-income communities inhabited 
by around 360,000 people (SEDESOL, 2018). Many of 
the area’s structures are two or three story houses 
built out of cement block and concrete slabs, which 
are less resistant to earthquake shaking than other 
more flexible materials. Worse, these structures are 
autoconstructed without professional supervision, 
and in most cases are built in stages, with floors add-
ed as families grow and require more space. Further, 
since jobs are largely informal (according to INEGI 
in 2019 job informality in the city is almost 60%) it is 
difficult to predict income and plan for construction. 
Depending on family needs and available resources, 
the autoconstrucción process can last for years. 
The alcaldía of Tláhuac is made up of marshy wet-
lands and soft clay soils left over from the drained 
lakebed of Lake Texcoco. Many of the settlements in 
Tlahuac are pueblos originarios (prehispanic towns) 
devoted to agriculture, while others originated as 
squatter settlements that were later formalized, and 
some others are semi-planned colonias populares 
(working class neighborhoods). In the 1970s, during 
one of many periods of intense peripheral growth in 
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Mexico City, Tláhuac was subjected to a rapid urban-
ization period despite its unstable soil conditions. 
What was once farmland was subdivided into 3200 
200 sq meter plots of land intended for development, 
and poor migrants from Michoacán, Oaxaca, Guerre-
ro, and Jalisco began to populate the area, where they 
found work, raised families, and built community. 
Colonia del Mar is a small neighborhood established 
in an especially marshy part of Tláhuac. According 
to informal accounts, the colonia was briefly consid-
ered as a potential site for an amusement park by a 
japanese organization. However, the soil conditions 
were declared so unstable that the project was can-
celed. If this story is accurate, it would appear subsoil 
studies were disregarded as the Mexican government 
set about urbanizing the site. Along with the pasto-
ral migrants who moved into the developing area, 
squatters who formerly populated the neighboring 
hills were relocated to Colonia del Mar when the hills 
Fig. 2 – Damaged 
house supported by 
wood formwork a 
year after the earth-
quake (Photo Luis 
Razzo).  
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Fig. 3 – Colonia del 
Mar, Tláhuac situated 
on the dry lakebed 
of historic Texcoco. 
(Data Source: Source: 
Datos Abiertos 
Ciudad de Mexico at 
https://datos.cdmx.
gob.mx; Map:  
B. McElvain, 2019).
were rezoned as conservation land. The government 
implemented clientelist practices, an exploitative sys-
tem of patronage, that was a normal part of the city’s 
informal and formal growth at the time. The original 
plots of land were promised to those who settled there 
at 250 square meters, with the agreement that more 
numerous families would get access to additional 
plots through despliegue, or “land grabbing” that con-
tributed to the rapid urbanization of the area. Because 
much of the area is autoconstructed, it is unclear how 
much the government has allowed development ver-
sus the possibility of community generated growth. 
Colonia del Mar and other communities in Tláhuac 
experience and adapt to shocks like earthquake di-
sasters differently than the region’s more connected, 
affluent areas. Over a year after the 2017 earthquake 
disaster, people in del Mar still have limited access to 
water and other resources, and have adapted to living 
with deep grietas, or cracks from ground failure, that 
It is unclear 
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inhibit street and walkway mobility in and around the 
neighborhood and further isolate the already mar-
ginalized community. According to official figures, in 
the 2017 earthquake over 5,000 houses were damaged 
in the 2017 earthquake in Colonia del Mar alone. Of 
these damaged homes, 1,200 have been declared in-
habitable. In addition to the structural damage, 38 gri-
etas were counted in the streets of the neighborhood 
(Ahedo, 2017). Crime has also increased in proportion 
to the damage, and people are living in dangerously 
compromised structures and rebuilding with dan-
gerous or seismically vulnerable materials. Colonia 
del Mar, like much of Tláhuac, has not yet started 
a meaningful recovery process despite extensive 
damage to homes and infrastructure in the alcaldía. 
The immediate response by officials was poor all over 
the city, but was especially lacking in these peripheral 
communities.
Fig. 4 – “I am not a 
victim of the Septem-
ber 19th earthquake, 
but rather of a years 
long collapsed swage 
system. I dare the 
government to prove 
me wrong” (Photo 
Luis Razzo).
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Community Perception of Risk
There is no evidence of the rubble story being true on 
any gobierno website or in any official public docu-
ments. Yet, if you ask anyone in Tláhuac about the di-
saster landfill beneath Colonia del Mar, you will hear 
the same story about the earthquake in 1985, and the 
dumping of escombros para rellenar (underground 
rubble) that makes the neighborhood unsafe. In 
fact, informal conversation with virtually anyone in 
Mexico City familiar with Tláhuac or public risk policy 
will unofficially support the story, too. Residents feel 
so strongly about this, many have expressed a desire 
to be relocated, their slogan being “reubicación no 
reconstrucción!” (relocation no reconstruction). As 
mentioned, problems with grietas and subsidence 
have been present since the early days of the colonia 
throughout the city’s peripheral areas. However, the 
seriousness of these issues was laid bare after the 
2017 earthquake. It is now clear and agreed upon by 
Fig. 5 – Colonia del 
Mar, Tláhuac social 
and ground fracture 
vulnerability. (Data 
Source: Datos 
Abiertos Ciudad de 
Mexico at https://
datos.cdmx.gob.mx; 
Map: B. McElvain, 
2019).
The vulnerable 
conditions in which 
people in Colonia 
del Mar live are 
directly related to 
human decision-
making via the 
historic processes 
of desiccation and 
underground water 
extraction.
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officials that reconstruction in the area is unsafe. This 
is plainly stated in the government-produced Atlas 
Nacional de Riesgos (National Atlas of Risk), which 
classifies the area as “high risk”.
The vulnerable conditions in which people in Co-
lonia del Mar live are directly related to human 
decision-making via the historic processes of desic-
cation and underground water extraction. Further, 
government officials over multiple periods of growth 
over Mexico City’s history either deliberately urban-
ized or allowed urbanization on a site with unsafe 
below-ground conditions. Two years after the 2017 
earthquake the area is so openly recognized as unsafe, 
there is no clear government strategy regarding 
reconstruction or relocation for damnificados (vic-
tims) and affected people. The local community has 
organized and formed coalitions, particularly around 
learning about subsoil characteristics and demand-
ing professional assessments of the feasibility of 
remaining on the site. According to neighbors repre-
sentatives interviewed at the site, there are multiple 
lawsuits from residents looking to make the area safer 
by repaving the streets with permeable materials to 
prevent the exacerbation of underground caverns 
and cracks from excessive rainfall. Other lawsuits are 
complaints about underground water extraction, or 
petitions for reforestation to reverse erosion. None-
theless, given the extremely unstable subsoil condi-
tions these measures seem palliative and insufficient.
Conclusion
Mexico City is prone to earthquake hazards, and 
like many Latin American cities also experiences 
increased disaster risk because of poorly maintained 
infrastructure, poor or nonexistent building code 
enforcement, neglect by official programs, and higher 
vulnerability due to poverty and unbalanced eco-
nomic power through historical processes. It is clear 
that human decision making since the founding of 
Mexico-Tenochtitlan has led to increased risk for all 
of Mexico City. Established in the middle of a lake 
in a basin with high seismic hazard, and then devel-
oped over time for capitalist production schemes that 
first benefitted Spain, and later brought Mexico into 
modernity under the Porfiriato, Mexico City’s disaster 
risk is distributed spatially and along geologic and 
class lines. Most of the Mexico City metropolitan zone 
Disasters are 
regional, but 





apparent at smaller 
scales.
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is exposed to multiple environmental hazards, includ-
ing relatively frequent and widespread earthquakes 
and flooding.
Disaster risk can be understood with the assumption 
that risk is socially and politically produced through-
out city histories, and that the functions of risk are 
sensitive to scale and coping capacity, which creates a 
reactive environment for prevention, mitigation, and 
recovery efforts in a given political and socioeconom-
ic ecosystem. Disasters are regional, but risk is local, 
often influenced by community characteristics and 
vulnerabilities apparent at smaller scales, as we can 
see with Colonia del Mar in Tláhuac. Even leaving out 
the political corruption the city is known for, if we are 
thinking about the distribution of risk in this context 
of scale and history, is it any wonder the residents 
of Tláhuac and others so readily believe the stories 
about the below-ground conditions in Colonia del 
Mar? Isn’t it believable? 
If the risk assumed by residents of Colonia del Mar 
in Tláhuac is produced and made worse by gov-
ernment-led illegal processes, what should be the 
approach to reconstruct or relocate -- and which is 
the better option for communities largely forgotten 
by city leadership? Managed retreat from del Mar to 
another colonia where there is less risk, seems impos-
sible. Recovery in place is difficult to fathom over the 
long-term, knowing the below-ground conditions are 
so dangerous in an earthquake. In Mexico’s reactive 
political environment, planners and officials have 
turned to “resilient” strategies and more proactive 
approaches, attempting to tackle socioeconomic issues 
ahead of the next disaster. Yet, when the 2017 earth-
quake struck, the region was still in the later stages of 
recovery from the 1985 earthquake. In partnership 
with the World Bank and 100 Resilient Cities, the city’s 
efforts include community outreach in other periph-
eral alcaldías adjacent to Tláhuac, like Iztapalapa and 
Xochimilco. One consultant for a related NGO told us 
that “Tláhuac is a big unknown” when asked about 
the recovery process in the alcaldía for this paper. Un-
der the Peña Nieto administration, the city’s ongoing 
recovery efforts were moved under Protección Civil 
and a new Reconstruction Plan was established. For 
the long term, the government has invested in well-in-
tentioned but dubious multi-use community center 
programs like Pilares (Puntos de Innovación, Libertad, 
Arte, Educación y Saberes) intended to bolster commu-
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nity ties and also serve as recovery centers in case of 
a disaster. Yet, other well-intentioned programs, like 
Infonavit (Instituto del Fondo Nacional de Vivienda 
para los Trabajadores) for subsidizing and developing 
social housing, continue to create risk in the periph-
ery through loan-matching, bank credits, and pub-
lic-private partnerships with developers who build 
on the lakebed areas (Mendo-Gutiérrez, Cortéz-Lara, 
2018).
The Mexican government’s lack of accountability 
contributes to the perpetuation of socially and histor-
ically produced risk and promotes distrust. Because 
risk is produced through human decision-making and 
seemingly unrelated historic and political processes, 
city authorities have failed to prevent or lessen risk 
with reactive policies and approaches. Communities 
affected by disasters not only have limited possibili-
ties for recovery, but are also keenly aware that they 
live in high risk areas and fear the inevitable next 
disaster. Making their stories visible is only a small 
step towards addressing the official neglect.
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